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 
Abstract— Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) have recently become 
an important research field not only because of their important 
and varied application scenarios, including transportation 
systems, smart homes, surveillance systems, and wearable devices, 
but also because the fundamental infrastructure has yet to be well 
addressed. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), as a type of 
supporting infrastructure, play an irreplaceable role in CPS 
design. Specifically, secure communication in WSNs is vital 
because information transferred in the networks can be easily 
stolen or replaced. Therefore, this paper presents a novel 
distributed Low-Storage Clone Detection protocol (LSCD) for 
WSNs. We first design a detection route along the perpendicular 
direction of a witness path with witness nodes deployed in a ring 
path. This ensures that the detection route must encounter the 
witness path because the distance between any two detection 
routes must be smaller than the witness path length. In the LSCD 
protocol, clone detection is processed in a non-hotspot region 
where a large amount of energy remains, which can improve 
energy efficiency as well as network lifetime. Extensive 
simulations demonstrate that the lifetime, storage requirements, 
and detection probability of our protocol are substantially 
improved over competing solutions from the literature. 
 
Index: Terms—wireless sensor network security, clone 
detection, network lifetime, distributed route 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are one of the most 
important compositions of Cyber-Physical Systems 
(CPSs) [1], [2], which monitor physical phenomena from 
surrounding environments to dynamically interact with human 
activities and/or machine systems such as surveillance systems, 
body health monitoring systems, and intelligent transportation 
systems. Secure communication in WSNs is vital because 
information transferred through such networks can be easily 
stolen or replaced [1]-[3]. For instance, an adversary could 
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capture sensor nodes and acquire all the information stored 
therein—the nodes are commonly assumed to not be tamper 
proof. Therefore, an adversary may replicate captured nodes 
and deploy them in the network to perform a variety of 
malicious activities [2], [4]-[8]. This type of attack is referred to 
as a clone attack [4]-[6]. A cloned node, because it has 
legitimate information, may participate in network operations 
in the same manner as a non-compromised node, and thus, the 
cloned node can launch a variety of attacks [5]-[7]. It is not 
difficult to imagine that this may present a huge risk to users in 
many types of WSN applications (e.g., flood monitoring). 
Therefore, early detection and recognition of cloned nodes has 
important significance to network security [4], [7], [8].  
Witness-based clone detection methods that allow 
resource-constrained sensor nodes to mitigate node capture and 
clone attacks have been developed [5]-[9]. In such methods, 
each node probabilistically forwards its identity (ID) to a set of 
coordinates that act as witness nodes. Such methods use the fact 
that clones have the same ID as the captured node but are at 
different locations. Hence, a clone is detected when two nodes 
report the same ID but different locations. 
Recently, various distributed witness-based solutions for 
addressing this fundamental problem have been proposed. 
However, these solutions are not satisfactory due to the 
following three reasons. First, the storage capacities of sensor 
nodes are limited. Due to the very limited nodal storage 
capacity, protocols at the Oሺ√݊ሻ storage level often cannot be 
used in practice [5], [9]. Second, the probability of clone 
detection is quite low. In distributed clone detection protocols, 
because witness and detection routes are distributed, ensuring 
that detection routes encounter witness nodes is challenging. 
Hence, in current research, the clone detection probability is 
often 60% [4], [6], [8], which cannot be applied to applications 
with higher security requirements [10], [11]. Third, the network 
lifetime is not considered. To achieve a higher clone detection 
probability in distributed networks, a system must suffer higher 
communication costs, which results in the consumption of the 
limited battery power of sensor nodes and decreased network 
lifetime [2], [4], [9]. 
In this paper, we propose a novel clone detection protocol, 
named the Low-Storage Clone Detecting protocol (LSCD). The 
most obvious feature is that the LSCD protocol is not affected 
by the network scale or number of nodes so that the storage 
requirement remains at a small constant level. Moreover, the 
LSCD protocol has a very high detection probability, high 
security performance, and improved energy efficiency. The 
main innovations of this paper are as follows: 
(1) The LSCD has low storage requirements. 
To the best of our knowledge, the LSCD protocol is the first 
clone detection protocol that achieves storage at small constant 
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Φ  levels. There is a tradeoff between storage capacity and 
energy consumption, namely, more detection routes can ensure 
a higher clone detection probability with decreased number of 
witnesses. Meanwhile, we found that, due to the "energy hole" 
phenomenon in WSNs, the remaining energy is as high as 90% 
under the premature death of the network [12]-[15]. Therefore, 
the LSCD protocol fully utilizes the remaining energy to create 
as many detection routes as possible to reduce the storage 
requirements of the node and achieves a small constant storage 
requirement. 
(2) The LSCD protocol has fully distributed 
characteristics and provides strong protection against 
attacks and a high detection probability. 
In the LSCD protocol, witness nodes form route paths along 
circles, with a sink serving as the center, because clone 
detection is processed along the centrifugal (or centripetal) 
direction, and the distance between any two detection routes is 
shorter than the witness path length. Thus, the witness path 
must encounter the detection route, ensuring that the LSCD 
theoretically has a 100% clone detection probability. Moreover, 
witness routes and clone detection routes are randomly 
generated. Thus, even if the adversary knows the LSCD 
algorithm, the locations of witness nodes and detection route 
information cannot be obtained. Therefore, the LSCD protocol 
has fully distributed characteristics and strong robustness to 
compromise attacks. 
(3) The LSCD protocol prolongs the network lifetime. 
The LSCD protocol inactively performs clone detection in 
hotspots to reduce energy consumption. Meanwhile, in regions 
with abundant energy, clone detection is performed as 
aggressively as possible to ensure a higher detection probability, 
which effectively improves network lifetime. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In 
section Ⅱ, related works are reviewed. The system model and 
the problem statement are described in section III. The novel 
LSCD protocol is presented in section IV. A security 
performance analysis is provided in section V. Section VI 
presents the experimental results and comparison. Finally, we 
conclude this paper in section VII.  
II. RELATED WORK 
A clone attack proceeds as follows [2], [5], [6], [8], [9]. First, 
an adversary simply needs to physically capture one node from 
the network; obtain its security credentials, such as codes and 
cryptographic materials; and, if necessary, reprogram the node 
to modify its behavior. Then, with little effort, the adversary 
replicates the node to create an army of malicious nodes at its 
command. Finally, it deploys these replicas back into the WSN, 
possibly at strategic positions, to launch a variety of insidious 
insider attacks to undermine the network protocol [2], [9]. The 
goal of clone detection is to detect cloned nodes with high 
probability [2], [9]. Detection protocols can be divided into 
centric and distributed algorithms according to their applied 
control modes. 
Centric protocols require all nodes to send their neighbors’ 
location information to the base station for detection [16]. 
Other solutions rely on local detection, such as voting 
mechanisms, which use nodes within a neighborhood to 
confirm the legitimacy of a given node [15], [17]. A method 
called Area-Based Clustering Detection (ABCD) detects clones 
based on two or more different locations to avoid the 
shortcomings of single base station detection [18]. However, 
the setback of centric protocols is that if the adversary 
intercepts the base station message or interferes with base 
station communications, centric detection will fail. Moreover, 
nodes near the base station are required to forward substantially 
more packets than other nodes, which seriously decreases the 
network lifetime; thus, distributed protocols have seen higher 
preference [9]. 
Distributed detection protocols can be divided into the 
following categories according to the generation mode of 
witness nodes: 
(1) Randomly generated witness mode. This protocol maps a 
node’s ID to a random witness node set [9]. Because the 
witness is randomly generated, an adversary cannot determine 
the corresponding witness in advance even if it obtains the map 
function; therefore, it cannot compromise witnesses, thereby 
achieving better security. However, due to the randomness in 
witness generation, it is difficult to ensure that a message from 
the same node ID has the same witness; thus, the clone 
detection probability is low. Moreover, the communication and 
storage requirements are also relatively large. Research on this 
type of protocol includes Non-Deterministic and Fully 
Distributed (NDFD) protocols [5]. As discussed in [9], 
Randomized Multicast (RM) is a distributed algorithm for 
detecting node replications in which √݊  witness nodes are 
randomly selected among n nodes in the network. When 
detecting clones, each node’s neighbors probabilistically 
forward claims to a randomly selected set of witness nodes. The 
disadvantage of the RM protocol lies in the communication cost, 
which is ܱሺ݊ଶሻ , and its comparatively low detection 
probability. The Line-Selected Multicast (LSM) protocol in [9] 
decreases communication costs by increasing storage, and its 
core idea is as follows. Considering a nodal degree of d, node a 
randomly selects g nodes as its witness with probability p. Thus, 
there are gpd witnesses, and then, a’s neighbor forwards a 
claim of a’s ID and location to these gpd witnesses and stores 
the claim in the route. During clone detection, the node can 
select a certain number of nodes as the route destination and 
check whether the detection route will encounter a witness; thus, 
the detection probability is improved but at a cost of larger 
storage requirements of ܱሺ݊ሻ. 
(2) Deterministic witness generation mode. This protocol 
deterministically maps the nodal ID to a set of witnesses. The 
RED protocol has received the most attention under this mode 
[2]. This protocol’s core idea is that a set of witnesses can be 
computed by a map function pseudo rand (rand, IDx, g). Under 
clone detection, detected information is sent to the witness. 
This protocol has high detection probability and low 
communication cost but suffers from a low robustness against 
compromise attacks. Once an adversary captures a node, it can 
obtain the map function and thus becomes aware of this witness 
set. Then, it can compromise this witness set, resulting in 
detection failure [10]. 
(3) Randomly deterministic witness generation mode. In this 
mode, a node obtains only the witness location region through 
the map function, and witness nodes remain unknown; 
therefore, it is difficult for the adversary to compromise all 
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witnesses of this region. Moreover, this mode represents a 
tradeoff between randomness and determinism, and thus, its 
storage requirements, communication costs and robustness to 
compromise attacks are between the other above two modes. 
Related research was proposed in [10]: (Single Deterministic 
Cell (SDC) and Parallel Multiple Probabilistic Cells (P-MPC). 
A replicated node detection approach called SET was proposed 
in [4]. 
In [19], we proposed an energy-efficient ring-based clone 
detection (ERCD) protocol that achieved a high detection 
probability with random witness selection while ensuring 
normal network operation and satisfactory WSN lifetime. In the 
ERCD protocol, a witness is selected in a ring path around the 
sink; however, the location of the ring is randomly generated. 
Therefore, the attacker cannot easily determine the location; 
this provides the system with high robustness to attack. Clone 
detection can meet the rings of witnesses by sending one 
concentric (centrifugal) route; therefore, the probability of 
clone detection is high. The disadvantage suffered by this 
scheme is that it is difficult to form a ring. However, the LSCD 
scheme only requires a small ring routing to store witnesses; 
thus, it not only achieves stronger practical performance but 
also reduces the storage requirements of the nodes.  
For mobile node clone detection, Zhu et al. proposed a 
distributed solution called NBDS [17], which considers node 
mobility and allows for occasional movement. Related research 
can be found in [6], [20]. 
III. THE SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A. The System Model 
Network model 
(1) We consider n sensor nodes, uniformly and randomly 
scattered in a circular network; a nodal transmission radius r; a 
network radius R ൌ ԰r; and a nodal density ρ [3], [21]. Data 
are periodically collected, and nodes send sensed data to the 
sink via multi-hop during each data collection round [13], [21], 
[22]. 
(2) We assume that link-level security has been established 
through a conventional cryptography-based bootstrapping 
algorithm. We also assume that a link key is safe unless the 
adversary physically compromises either side of the link. We 
also assume that there exists a trusted and powerful sink that 
will never be compromised [23].  
(3) The sensor nodes are assumed to know their relative 
locations, the sink node location and the hops to the sink. We 
also assume that each sensor node has knowledge of its 
adjacent neighboring nodes. The information about the relative 
location of the sensor domain may also be broadcast through 
this network to facilitate updating of the routing information [2], 
[9]. Thus, because of the lack of GPS requirements, the LSCD 
protocol lowers demands on the system. 
The Adversary Model 
An adversary can compromise a set of network nodes and 
extract their information. Using this extracted data, the 
adversary can then fabricate exact functional copies of captured 
nodes (clones) and deploy the clones back into the network [2], 
[9]. We consider that the adversary is powerful and can subvert 
a limited number of legitimate sensor nodes at unpredictable 
locations simultaneously [2].  
We assume that the adversary operates in a stealthy manner, 
therein attempting to avoid detection [2], and the adversary 
cannot readily create new IDs for nodes [2]. Newsome et al. 
described several techniques for preventing an adversary from 
deploying nodes with arbitrary IDs [5]-[10]. 
B. Energy Consumption Model and Related Definitions 
ܧ௧ ൌ ݈ܧ௘௟௘௖ ൅ ݈ߝ௙௦݀ଶ, 					݂݅		݀ ൏ ݀଴
ܧ௧ ൌ ݈ܧ௘௟௘௖ ൅ ݈ߝ௔௠௣݀ସ,			݂݅		݀ ൐ ݀଴ (1)
Adopting a typical energy consumption model [12], [21], 
[24], [25], the energy consumption for transmission is given by 
Formula 1. Because the energy consumption for receiving is 
relatively low compared with that for transmission, in this 
paper, we consider only transmission energy consumption. 
ܧ௘௟௘௖  represents the transmitting circuit loss. Both the free space (݀ଶ  power loss) and the multi-path fading (݀ସ  power 
loss) channel models are used in the model, depending on the 
distance between the transmitter and receiver. ߝ௙௦	and ߝ௔௠௣ are 
the amounts of energy required to perform power amplification 
in the two models. l denotes the number of data bits. The 
problem statement is as follows: 
The optimization goal of this paper is as follows: 
(1) Network lifetime maximization. As in [3], [12], the 
network lifetime is defined as the time to the death of the first 
node. We consider ݁௜ଵ as the energy consumption of node i for regular data collection, and ݁௜ଶ is that for clone detection. Then, the maximization of the network lifetime can be expressed as 
follows: 
݉ܽݔሺܶሻ ൌ ݉݅݊ max଴ழ௜ஸ௡ሺ݁௜
ଵ ൅ ݁௜ଶሻ (2)
(2) High clone detection probability. For any node a, if an 
adversary clones nodes such as a’, a’’…., and if the detection 
probability for node a can be expressed as ௗܲሺܽሻ, then the maximization of ௗܲሺܽሻ is as follows: maxሺPሻ ൌ maxሺ ௗܲሺܽሻሻ (3)
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Fig. 1 Illustrate of the low storage clone detecting protocol. 
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(3) Smaller storage requirement. Generally, the nodal storage 
capacity is relatively small, often on the order of a few 
kilobytes [8]. Therefore, the third optimization goal of our 
protocol is to minimize the storage requirement, namely, 
minሺMሻ |M ൌ min	ሺሺ෍݊௜.݉௘
௡
௜ୀଵ
ሻ/nሻ⋀ሺ∀݊௜݉௘ ൑ τሻ (4) 
݊௜.݉௘ denotes the required clone detection storage capacity for node ݊௜ , and τ denotes the upper bound of the allowed storage. 
In summary, the optimization goal of this paper is   
ۖە
۔
ۖۓ ݉ܽݔሺܶሻ ൌ ݉݅݊	max଴ழ௜ஸ௡ሺ ௜݁
ଵ ൅ ௜݁ଶሻ	
maxሺPሻ ൌ max	ሺ ௗܲሺߝሻሻ	
minሺMሻ |M ൌ min	ሺሺ෍݊௜.݉௘
௡
௜ୀଵ
ሻ/nሻ⋀ሺ∀݊௜.݉௘ ൑ τሻ
(5)
The optimization also includes the distributed characteristics, 
robustness against compromise attacks and system demands, 
which will be discussed in the performance analysis section. 
To allow the readers to better understand this paper, the main 
notations introduced in this paper are listed in Table I. 
TABLE I 
NOTATIONS 
ܴ      The network radius  
ݎ	      The transmission range of a node  
Ψ      The length of a witness path 
԰       The max hop distance from the Sink 
݄       The current node distance from the Sink in hops 
݊	       The number of nodes in the network 
	ܫܦ௔  The identity information of node ࣵ  ݈௔      The location node ࣵ claims to occupy ܺ௔	    The message including node ࣵ’s private information ߣ       The data collection frequency 
ߣᇱ      The clone detection frequency 
λ′′     The witness construction frequency  
ߪ       The ratio of data packet length over detection packet 
length 
d       Average degree of each node 
p       The probability a neighbor will forward location  
information 
g       The number of forwarding nodes selected by each  
neighbor	 
ߝଶ, ߝଶ, ߝଷ The random walk route hop for clone detection  and constructing witness paths 
IV. LSCD DESIGN 
A. Overview of the Proposed LSCD Protocol  
As shown in Fig. 1, the LSCD protocol consists of two 
components: the witness building stage and the clone detection 
stage. 
(1) The witness building stage can be divided into two stages. 
Stage 1: Let ࣠ሺܫܦ, ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊, ݄ሻ be the map function, which 
can set the node ID and location map to an arbitrary integer 
among [2, ԰	]; however, for the same ID and location, the 
calculated results are not always the same when using 
࣠ሺܫܦ, ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊, ݄ሻ. An example of such a map function can be 
easily found in [2], [19]. For node ࣵ, ݇= ࣠ሺࣵ. ܫܦ, ࣵ. ݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊,
݄ሻ is the hop count between the node ࣵ and the Sink (see Fig. 
1), that is, the hop count from the witness of node ࣵ to the Sink 
is ݇ . Then, node ࣵ  must route his ܫܦ	and	݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊  to the 
witness nodes, which are ݇ hops away from the Sink. However, 
to confuse the adversary, in the LSCD protocol, node ࣵ does 
not directly route data to the nodes, which are ݇ hops away 
from the Sink; rather, the following methods are used to 
enhance the security of the protocol. After node ࣵ is randomly 
routed a given distance using the random routing method, node 
ࣵ routes data to the nodes that are ݇ hops away from the Sink 
using a directional routing method and then form an arc path 
around the sink using the jumping routing method. The specific 
process is as follows: node ࣵ randomly routes ॖ ൌrand(ࣣ) hops 
to node b carrying its (ID, location), and then, b compares its 
hop count to the sink (b.hop) with k to make a decision as to 
whether to route centrifugally or centripetally. This process is 
repeated until reaching node b’, which is k hops to the sink. 
Then, the first stage ends. In this stage, each node in the routing 
path does not need to store the ܫܦ	and	݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ of node ࣵ.  
Stage 2: The main task of stage 2 is to form a continuous 
length Ψ to the nodes that are ݇  hops away from the Sink. 
Similarly, to confuse the adversary, a routing path that cannot 
store the witness is formed at the beginning of the second stage; 
however, the true witness is stored in the node passed by in the 
last routing of the second stage. The process is as follows: node 
b’ randomly chooses the left hand (or right hand) direction for 
the same-hop routing (i.e., each node selects the next-hop nodes 
that are the same hop counts to the Sink) until node b’ routes to 
node ܾ′′. Then, node ܾ′ stores (ID, location) of node ࣵ on every 
node in the later route path until the route path length is set as a 
length Ψ , namely, ܾ′ܾ′′തതതതതത ൌ Ψ . After this stage, each node’s 
witness must be in the arc centered on the sink, which is k hops 
to the sink and has length 	Ψ . Because k and the arc are 
randomly generated, the adversary cannot calculate their value 
even though it captures the random function. Therefore, it 
cannot compromise these witnesses in advance, thus achieving 
high security. 
(2) The clone detection stage: In the LSCD protocol, the 
main innovation is that the witness of each node is stored in a 
route whose length is Ψ. Considering that the transmission 
radius of the node is ݎ, the number of storing witnesses of each 
node is ڿΨ ݎ⁄ ۀ, that is, the required storage space for storing 
witnesses in the LSCD protocol is unrelated to the number of 
nodes and network size: it is a constant. To the best of our 
knowledge, in most previous studies, the storage space required 
for storing the witnesses of nodes is related to the number of 
nodes ݊ [2], [5], [19], and the storage space for storing the 
witnesses of nodes in few studies is related to the network size 
԰ . Therefore, it is difficult to research the storage space 
requirements and costs of the nodes under large network 
scenarios. However, the LSCD protocol can overcome those 
shortcomings and thus is very suitable considering the minimal 
storage space provided by the nodes in WSNs. The LSCD 
protocol produces a constant storage space of the node because 
(1) the witnesses of nodes are along an arc route whose length is 
Ψ, and the center is the sink. Therefore, when performing clone 
detection, if the system creates many centrifugal clone 
detection routing paths departing from the sink, and if the 
distance among any two clone detection routes is less than Ψ, 
there will be a clone detection route and witness path that 
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intersect, which can achieve the goal of clone detection. Note 
that the witness of the nodes is in the arc route whose length is 
Ψ; however, the location of the arc route is arbitrary. Therefore, 
theoretically, the adversary does not obtain the position of 
where the witnesses are stored. (2) Moreover, the above shows 
that the distance between any two clone detections is less than 
Ψ  in the LSCD protocol; therefore, the number of clone 
detection routes is related to the length Ψ of the stored witness. 
The relationship is as follows: if the length Ψ increases, the 
number of required clone detection routes decreases, whereas if 
Ψ decreases, the number of required clone detection routes 
increases. In addition, a higher Ψ  results in greater storage 
space requirements for the nodes, and the number of clone 
detection routes is linearly proportional to the energy 
consumption of the network. This represents a tradeoff between 
the required storage space of nodes and the network lifetime. 
For example, if Ψ is a ring with the Sink as the center, only a 
clone detection routing can achieve the goal of clone detection. 
At this time, the energy consumption of the nodes required by 
clone detection is minimized; thus, the network lifetime is 
maximized, and the maximum length of the routing path of the 
witness is 2ߨ԰ݎ. Therefore, the storage space requirement for 
storing the witness is not constant; it is related to the network 
scale. Based on the above analysis, the LSCD protocol adopts a 
different scheme compared to previous clone detection 
methods to ensure that the required storage space of the nodes is 
a small constant and that the network lifetime is equal to the 
network lifetime with only one clone detection route. The 
length of the required ring in the area near the Sink is small; 
therefore, the number of required clone detection routes in the 
area near the sink is small. However, in the area far from the 
sink, the number of clone detection routes increases. Thus, the 
LSCD protocol creates few clone detection routes in areas near 
the Sink and creates numerous clone detection routes in areas 
far from the Sink. This can ensure that the distance between any 
two clone detection routes is less than Ψ. Moreover, note that, 
in WSNs, because the nodes near the Sink must forward the 
data of nodes far from the Sink, the energy consumption is 
much higher than that in the area far from the Sink. Thus, an 
"energy hole" is formed, resulting in premature network death. 
According to previous studies, more than 90% of the energy in 
the network cannot be used; therefore, the LSCD protocol 
makes fully utilizes the energy resources of WSNs. The 
generated clone detection routes in different areas can reduce 
the energy consumption in the hotspot region and fully utilize 
the energy in the area far from the Sink to create numerous 
clone detection routes. This can ensure network security and 
maximize network lifetime and network energy utilization. The 
method for establishing clone detection routing is discussed in 
the following. 
Clone detection is performed as shown in Fig. 2. In Fig. 2, 
the witness path is randomly distributed across the network, 
and the length of the witness path of each node is Ψ. The 
purpose of clone detection is that each witness path can meet at 
least one clone detection route. For security reasons, if the 
clone detection routing is always the same routing path, the 
adversary can intercept the detection route, thus invalidating 
clone detection, which is often overlooked in research on the 
original clone detection protocol. Therefore, in the LSCD 
protocol, for any node ࣵ, the node first randomly walks and 
routes to node ࣵ′. The location of node ࣵ′ is not predetermined, 
and the routing sponsor node also does not know the location; 
therefore, the adversary cannot cut its route. Then, node ࣵ′ 
routes to node ࣵ′′, which is located in the 2nd ring (i.e., it is 2 
hops to the sink) along the centripetal direction. In addition, 
node ࣵ′ routes to node ࣵ′′′, who is ԰ hops to the Sink along the 
centrifugal direction. Then, path ࣵ′′′ becomes the first clone 
detection routing. The clone detection routing is composed of 
the following process: 






''a
2a 3a

a
'a
3b
3,1b
3,2b
2b
2,1b
2,2b
1b
1,1b1,2b
'''a  Fig. 2: The clone detection process in the LSCD protocol. 
 
 
(a) The first same-hop routing. Considering that node ࣵ′′ 
starts performing clone detection, node ࣵᇱᇱ routes to node ࣵଶ, which must add the detection centrifugal routing path using a 
same-hop routing approach. The length of ࣵᇱᇱࣵଶതതതതതതത =ξΨ, where ξ is a number in the range (0,1). Because node ࣵ′′ knows that the 
hop count to Sink is ݇, the number of generated centrifugal 
routing paths under same-hop routing can be obtained: ࣦ௞ ൌڿሺ2ߨ݇ݎሻ ሺξΨሻ⁄ ۀ . However, node ࣵ′′  creates a centrifugal 
routing path when the length under same-hop routing is 
ڿሺ2ߨ݇ݎሻ ࣦ௞⁄ ۀ  until ࣦ௞  centrifugal routing paths are created. This will stop some-hop routing. (b) Centrifugal routing. 
Centrifugal routing finds the node whose hop count is larger 
than that of the next node until reaching the network boundary. 
(c) Same-hop routing. When the centrifugal routing route is 
outward one hop, this process determines whether to create a 
new routing. The condition of the judgment is based on the 
current node bଶ (for example), and its hop count to the Sink is फ़ if ڿሺ2ߨफ़ݎሻ ࣦ௞⁄ ۀ ൒ ξΨ, which illustrates the creation of a new centrifugal routing. At this time, node bଶ  initiates same-hop routing to the left and right. The routing length is calculated as 
ڿሺ2ߨफ़ݎሻ ሺ3ࣦ௞ሻ⁄ ۀ, and then, centrifugal routing is performed at the end of routing. The principle for creating a new route is as 
follows: (I) The routing node that does not initiate the new 
routing path will determine whether to create a detection route 
during the ring routing process. (Ⅱ) The new route is created 
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on both sides; therefore, the number of detection routes doubles 
after every construction. (Ⅲ ) Fewer detection routes are 
generated in regions near the sink and more routes are 
generated in regions away from the sink to fully utilize the 
remaining energy and meet the requirement that the distance 
between any two detection routes is shorter than the witness 
route length. Finally, the generation of detection routes in the 
LSCD protocol is completely distributed, and the nodes will not 
be attacked before routing. Thus, this protocol provides strong 
robustness against attacks. The process continues and 
eventually forms the clone detection route, as shown in Fig. 2. 
B. LSCD Protocol 
The LSCD protocol includes the witness building stage and 
the clone detection stage, as detailed in Algorithm 1. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND OPTIMIZATION 
A. Energy consumption and efficiency optimization 
The core idea of the LSCD protocol is to fully utilize the 
remaining energy in regions away from the sink to construct as 
many clone detection routes as possible to reduce witness 
routes and thus achieve "energy for storage". The following 
analyzes the energy consumption and the calculation of the 
LSCD storage requirements. 
Theorem 1: Considering R ൌ ԰r, where the nodal transmission 
radius is r, the clone detection data load of the node at ring i is 
௜ܾ ൌ 1 ൅ ሺ԰ଶ െ ݅ଶሻ/ሺ2݅ െ 1ሻ. Proof: Because the nodal data of ring ൒ i must be forwarded by 
nodes along ring i, the nodal data load at ring i is 
ܤ௜ ൌ ߨ԰ଶݎଶߩ െ ߨሺ݅ െ 1ሻଶݎଶߩ ൌ ߨݎଶߩሺ԰ଶ െ ݅ଶ ൅ 2݅ െ 1ሻ The number of data packets for each node is 
ܾଶ ൌ ሺߨݎଶߩሺ԰ଶ െ ݅ଶ ൅ 2݅ െ 1ሻሻ/ሺߨሺ2݅ െ 1ሻݎଶߩሻ	
This simplifies and proves the method.                                                     
  ■ 
      When i=1, the maximum nodal data load is ܾ௠௔௫ ൌ ԰ଶ . Considering that the energy consumption for a unit packet 
transmission is ݁௨, the nodal remaining energy at ring i is ߛ௜ ൌ ሺܾ௠௔௫ െ ܾ௜ሻ݁௨ 					ൌ ሺ԰ଶ െ 1 െ ሺ԰ଶ െ ݅ଶሻ/ሺ2݅ െ 1ሻሻ݁௨ (6)Theorem 2:  If the number of detection routes at ring i is ܿ௜, then the number of clone detection packets forwarded by 
nodes at ring i is ߞ௜ ൌ ሺ԰ଶߝܿ௜ሻ/ሺ2݅ െ 1ሻ. Proof: There are π԰ଶݎଶߩ	nodes in the network. Each node will 
process ܿ௜  detection routes at ring i, and the number of transmission hops for each detection route is ߝܿ௜, where ߝ is a constant greater than 1. Therefore, the number of hops that 
must be forwarded is	π԰ଶݎଶߩߝܿ௜. Then, for each node, we find ሺπ԰ଶݎଶߩߝܿ௜ሻ/(	πሺ2i െ 1ሻݎଶߩ)=(	԰ଶߝܿ௜ሻ/ሺ2i െ 1ሻ                   ■ 
In the LSCD protocol, except for detection routes, there are 
routes in the circumferential direction. Thus, the following 
gives the energy consumption for the clone detection of this 
part. 
Theorem 3:  In the LSCD protocol, the length of any node’s 
clone detection route in the circumferential direction is 2π԰r,  
Algorithm 1 Low-Storage Clone Detecting protocol 
Initialize：The hops of each sensor node to the sink are built 
through the flooding protocol [17]; 
Exchange the relational information with neighbors; 
Stage A:  building witness   
1: ܺ௔ ← Encryptሺܫܦ௔, ݈௔ሻ 
2: k ൌ PseudoRandሺܫܦ௔, ݈௔, ݄ሻ 
3: Random walk ߝଵ hops to node b, i ← b. hop, b’=b； 
4: while i് k do  
5:           if i ൏ k then 
6:               bᇱ ← NextNodeOnMaxHopሺbᇱሻ, i ← i ൅ 1;  
7:           else 
8:               bᇱ ← NextNodeOnLeastHopሺbᇱሻ, i ← i െ 1; 
9:          end if;  
10: end while; 
11: node b’ Random walk ߝଶ hops to node bᇱ′, where each 
node’s hop count is the same as the route path; i ← 1 
12:while i ൏ ڿΨ/ݎۀ	do 
13:      Let bᇱᇱrecord ܺ௔;  
14:        bᇱᇱ ← NextNodeOnSameHopሺbᇱᇱሻ, i ← i ൅ 1; 
15:end while; 
Stage B:  clone detection  
1: Random walk 3  hops to node aᇱ; aᇱ. tag ൌ true 
2: node aᇱ routing reverse sink to aᇱ′′ with broadcast ܺ௔; 
3: while  aᇱ. hop ് 2	do 
4:      aᇱ ← NextNodeOnLeastHopሺaᇱሻ;	Broadcast ܺ௔; 
5: end while;   
6: ∂ ←The hops need for routing to build the next clone 
route 
7: aᇱ. tag ൌ false 
8: routing ∂ hops to node c with same-hop routing;  
9: c. tag ൌ true, c route reverse to sink; 
10: for each clone detection route reverse to the sink； 
11: cᇱ ← NextNodeOnMaxHopሺcᇱሻ; Broadcast ܺ௔;  
12:      if c′. tag ൌ true then 
13:          compute ∂ using formula 9; 
14:           if ∂ ് 0 then 
15: along both left- and right-hand directions, 
same-hop routing hop to nodes c′′, c′′′; 
16: c′. tag ൌ false; 
17:               nodes c′′, c′′′ route reverse to the sink; 
18:            end if;    
19:       end if;   
20: end for; 
21: for each node S that hears ܺ௔ do 
22:         if ሺܫܦ௔, ݈௔ሻ of S ് ሺܫܦ௔, ݈௔ሻ in ܺ௔ then 
23:               trigger the revocation procedure; 
24:       end if 
25: end for
 
 
and the average number of packets forwarded is ζ ൌ
2ߨ԰ଷ/ሺ԰ଶ െ 1ሻ. Proof: The number of detection routes in the 
outermost layer is μ ൌ ሺ2π԰rሻ/Ψ. The length of any node’s 
detection route in the circumferential direction is Ψ; then, the 
total length is μΨ ൌ 2π԰r, and the number of times the node 
sends detection information is 2π԰. There are π԰ଶݎଶߩ nodes in 
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the network, and as such, the total number of times is 
π԰ଶݎଶߩ2π԰, except that the first ring has no detection routes. 
The average number of times nodes forward detection 
information for other regions is 	π԰ଶݎଶߩ2π԰/ሺπ԰ଶݎଶߩ െ
πݎଶߩሻ                                      
    ■ 
Theorem 4: Considering that the witness construction cycle is 
λ′′ data collection cycles, the number of forwarded packets for 
witness construction is 
ϑ ൌ λᇱᇱ ൬ߝଶ ൅ ሺ԰ െ 1ሻ2 ൅ ߝଷ ൅
Ψ
r ൰԰
ଶ/ሺ԰ଶ െ 1ሻ (7)
Proof: The nodal walk route hop count is	ߝଶ, and the average hop to the witness ring is ሺ԰ െ 1ሻ/2. The walk hop count along 
the ring is ߝଷ, R route hops along the ring is	Ψ/ݎ. Therefore, the hop count for the witness construction phase for each node is 
ߝଶ ൅	ሺ԰ െ 1ሻ/2 ൅ ߝଷ ൅ Ψ/ݎ . Because no witness is constructed in the first ring, the average number of forwarded 
packets for each node is λᇱᇱሺߝଶ ൅	ሺ԰ െ 1ሻ/2 ൅ ߝଷ ൅ Ψ/rሻ԰ଶ/ሺ԰ଶ െ 1ሻ. 
 
Inference 1: For nodes at ring i, the number of detection routes 
that can be created without decreasing the network lifetime is 
ܿ௜ ൌ
ߪሺ԰ଶ െ 1 െ ሺ԰ଶ െ ݅ଶሻሺ2݅ െ 1ሻ െ
߫ߣᇱ
ߪ െ
ߴߣᇱᇱ
ߪ ሻሺ2݅ െ 1ሻ
ሺ԰ଶߝሻߣ′  
Proof: Considering that the number of detection routes is ܿ௜, the detection packet length is 1/ߪ of the data packet length, and 
the clone detection frequency is ߣᇱ	 data collection cycles. 
According to Theorem 2, the detection energy consumption in 
the radial direction is ߞ௜݁௨ߣᇱ/ߪ. The remaining energy at ring i is ߛ௜, the energy consumption in the circumferential direction is	߫݁௨ߣᇱ/ߪ, and the witness construction energy consumption is ߴ݁௨ߣᇱᇱ/ߪ . Then, the remaining energy for detection is ߛ௜ െ߫݁௨ߣᇱ/ߪ െ ߴ݁௨ߣᇱᇱ/ߪ , and combining with the above, this aspect is proved. 
■ 
Theorem 5:  In the LSCD protocol, considering that the 
witness route length is Ψ, for a network with radius R ൌ ԰r, the 
number of required detection routes is Κ௜ ൌ 2௝|2௝ ≻ ቒଶగ௜௥ஏ ቓ  Proof: To ensure that a detection route encounters a witness, if 
the distance between any two detection routes is shorter than	Ψ, 
the number of detection routes must be at least ܿ′௜ ൌ ڿ2ߨ݅ݎ/Ψۀ. 
In the LSCD protocol, there are 2௝ detection routes at ring I; 
then, j should be the minimum value that ensures 2௝	is greater 
than ܿ′௜, and this 2௝ is what we desire. 
■ 
Theorem 6:  In the LSCD protocol, when the witness route 
length	Ψ	meets the following criterion, the detection process 
only uses the remaining energy. 
ܿ௜ ൒ 2௝|∀݅ ∈ ሼ2… . ԰ሽ, 2௝ ≻ ඄2ߨ݅ݎΨ ඈ (8)Proof: According to Inference 1, ܿ௜	detection routes can be created at ring i. According to Theorem 5, when the witness 
route length is	Ψ, Κ௜	routes must be created at ring i. Thus, if	Ψ can ensure Κ௜ ൒ ܿ௜ for any ring (see Formula 8), all detection routes can be created using remaining energy without affecting 
network lifetime. 
  ■ 
Inference 2: Considering that node ࣵ in the detection route 
stores 2௝	current routes, when ࣵ routes to ring i, the condition 
for new detection route construction and same-hop routing for 
these new routes is as follows: 
ቊ ߲ ൌ 0, if			2
௝ ൒ ሺ2ߨ݅ݎሻ/Ψ
∂ ൌ ሺ2πirሻ/ሺ2௝ାଵሻ, else  (9)
Proof: Obviously, if 2௝ ൒ ሺ2ߨ݅ݎሻ/Ψ, then the distance of any 
two detection routes is smaller than	Ψ. Therefore, no additional 
detection routes are needed, and ߲ ൌ 0; otherwise, additional 
detection routes are needed. According to the LSCD protocol, 
there are 2௝  routes. With the distance of any two routes as 
ሺ2πirሻ/2௝ , the newly created routes will be placed in the 
middle of the original routes, and the number of routes is 
doubled. Therefore, the length of the same ring route is ∂ ൌ
ሺ2πirሻ/ሺ2௝ାଵሻ. 
■ 
Theorem 7:  In the LSCD protocol, considering Theorem 6, 
the lifetime ratio of the LSCD protocol to that of the RED (or 
LSM) protocol is 
φ ൌ ݄
ଶ ൅ ݃݌݀ඥሺ݀ ൅ 1ሻ݄ߣ′′
ሺ݄ଶ ൅ 1 ൅ ߣ′′ሻ  (10)
Proof: Assume that	ߣᇱ ൌ ߣᇱᇱ ൌ 1. According to [2], [8], it has 
been proven that the number of clone detection packets under 
the RED (or LSM) protocol is	݃݌݀√݊ because the nodal degree 
is d; then, πݎଶߩ ൌ ݀ ൅ 1, and the total number of nodes in the 
network is n ൌ πሺ݄ݎሻଶߩ . Because πሺ݄ݎሻଶߩ/πݎଶߩ ൌ ݄ଶ , n ൌ
݄ଶሺ݀ ൅ 1ሻ . Thus, ݃݌݀√݊ ൌ ݃݌݀ඥሺ݀ ൅ 1ሻ݄ . There are ߣᇱᇱ 
clone detections in each data collection round, and thus, there 
are ݃݌݀ඥሺ݀ ൅ 1ሻ݄ߣᇱᇱ  clone detection packets because the 
amount of data in the first ring is maximized as ݄ଶ. Therefore, 
the maximum load of the RED and LSM protocols is ݄ଶ ൅
݃݌݀ඥሺ݀ ൅ 1ሻ݄ߣᇱᇱ. 
In the LSCD protocol, the maximum load at the first ring 
is ݄ଶ ൅ 1 ൅ ߣᇱᇱ , among which 1 is the witness route 
construction load and ߣᇱᇱ	is the clone detection load. Thus, the 
theorem is proved.  
■ 
B. Storage Overhead  
Theorem 8:  The average nodal storage requirement is 
Φ ൌ ሺڿ߰/ݎۀ԰ଶሻ/ሺ԰ଶ െ 1ሻ (11)
Proof: In the LSCD protocol, the stored route length for each 
nodal witness is ߰, and it is stored ڿ߰/ݎۀ	times. There are n ൌ
ሺπሺ݄ݎሻଶρሻ	nodes in total, and thus, the total storage is nڿ߰/ݎۀ 
because the first ring generates the witness. These witness 
storage requires are undertaken by n െ πݎଶߩ nodes. Therefore, 
the storage needed by each node is ሺπ԰ଶݎଶρڿ߰/ݎۀሻ/
ሺπ԰ଶݎଶρ െ πݎଶρሻ. 
■ 
C. Clone Detection probability 
Theorem 9: Given that the selected witnesses of node a are 
trustful, if there exists a clone of node a’, the cloned node can 
always be detected. 
Proof: As observed from the LSCD protocol, the witness of 
node a must be stored in an arc with length	Ψ, and the distance 
between any two detection routes must be smaller than	Ψ. Thus, 
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during clone detection, the detection route that contains node 
ࣵ’s (ID, location) must encounter the witness of node ࣵ, and 
this reveals to the witness that nodes a and a’ have the same ID 
but are at different locations. Thus, the cloned node can always 
be detected.                         
■ 
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
OMNET++ is used for experimental verification [26]. If not 
specified, the parameters are as follows: R=600 m, r=50 m, the 
node number is 1000, ߣᇱ ൌ ߣᇱᇱ ൌ 1, Ψ ൌ 7ݎ, and σ ൌ 5. The 
energy consumption parameter settings can be observed in [12], 
[21] and can be found in Table II. 
TABLE II 
NETWORK PARAMETER 
Parameter   Value  
Threshold distance (d0) (m)   87 
Sensing range rs (m)   15  
Eelec(nJ/bit)   50  
efs (pJ/bit/m2)   10 
eamp (pJ/bit/m4)   0.0013  
Initial energy (J)   0.5 
 
 
In the experiment, the frequency for generating the data of 
the node is ߣ, and the generated data are routed to the Sink 
through the shortest-routing approach. The clone detection 
frequency of each node is ߣᇱ , and the witness construction 
frequency is ߣᇱᇱ. Data generation, clone detection, and witness 
construction are performed periodically according to the 
frequency period. The energy consumption of the nodes and the 
storage conditions are observed, and a certain proportion of 
nodes are cloned to check whether the LSCD protocol can 
check cloned nodes. 
 Fig. 3: The energy consumption of the LSCD protocol. 
 
 
Fig. 3 shows the 3D energy consumption map of the LSCD 
protocol. In the clone detection protocol of [2], [9], the data 
collection results in not only a greater energy consumption of 
the area near the Sink but also the probability of the clone 
detection routing through the network center being higher than 
in other regions. This leads to the greater energy consumption 
of the area near the Sink, which reduces the network lifetime. 
However, the LSCD protocol is not the same as the previous 
protocol, which avoids the hotspot area, increasing the energy 
consumption in areas far from the Sink. In addition, as observed, 
although the energy consumption in the non-hotspot region is 
increased in the LSCD protocol, it remains smaller than in the 
hotspot region; therefore, the network lifetime is not affected 
by clone detection. 
A. Experimental results for energy consumption and lifetime 
Fig. 4 shows the energy consumption comparison between 
the LSCD and LSM protocols. The figure shows that the energy 
consumption for data collection is substantial. In the LSCD 
protocol, the detection and witness construction energy 
consumptions in hotspot regions are minor, thus having 
minimal effect on the total energy consumption. In the LSM 
protocol, the detection energy consumption in hotspots is quite 
large compared to that under the LSCD protocol; therefore, the 
network lifetime is reduced. Moreover, under the LSCD 
protocol, the remaining energy in non-hotspot regions can fully 
meet the conditions in Theorem 6. 
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Fig. 5 shows that, in one data collection round, the LSCD 
protocol improved the network lifetime by 30% to 90% 
compared to the LSM protocol with increased clone detection 
frequency. Fig. 6 shows the LSCD protocol’s improved 
lifetime of 27% to 45% compared to LSM with increased 
network scale (԰). Fig. 7 shows that the energy consumption 
under the LSCD protocol is not related to the nodal degree, and 
the network lifetime is essentially unchanged. In contrast, 
under the LSM protocol, as the nodal degree increases, the 
communication cost rapidly increases; therefore, the lifetime 
quickly decreases for larger nodal degrees. The cost is only 1/3 
of that of the LSCD protocol; thus, the LSCD protocol provides 
good lifetime performance. 
B. Storage Overhead  
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the storage requirements under 
different nodal degrees and network scales. As observed, the 
LSCD protocol requires minimal storage, only 1/5 to 1/2 of that 
of LSM. The results show the following: the storage space 
requirements can increase with increasing number of nodes 
(see Fig. 8) or network size (see Fig. 9). In addition, the  
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required storage space of the LSCD protocol is constant. This is 
because, in the LSCD protocol, the storage length of the 
witness of each node is fixed as Ψ; therefore, it is only a small 
constant and does not change with changing nodal degree or 
network scale. Thus, it is particularly suitable for large-scale 
networks. Because the LSCD protocol consumes substantially 
more energy in non-hotspot areas, the storage space is reduced. 
This result can be obtained by increasing the clone detection 
route length in the non-hotspot area, namely, so-called "energy 
for storage". In general, a smaller Ψ results in a reduced storage 
space requirement, and larger required routing paths when the 
protocol performs clone detection requires substantial energy in 
non-hotspot areas. Therefore, if there are no time limitations on 
clone detection, the general recommendation is to fully utilize 
non-hotspot energy and minimize Ψ. 
C. Detection probability 
 
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show the clone detection probability 
under different nodal degrees d and h, respectively. We can 
conclude the following. First, the clone detection probability 
under the LSCD protocol is higher, approximately 90%, 
whereas it is only 60% under LSM. Second, the clone detection 
probability under the LSCD protocol is not related to the 
network scale or nodal degree and ensures a high probability of 
success. In contrast, under LSM, this probability will decrease 
as d increases because clone detection under LSM is processed 
using at least two routes that intersect at the same node. 
Therefore, with increasing d, more nodes can be chosen as the 
next hop. Hence, the probability of two routes intersecting at 
the same node is decreased.  
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Table III displays the performance comparison between the 
LSCD protocol and several typical clone detection protocols, 
where the symbol ϖ denotes the number of witness nodes that 
store the local claim of a cell and q denotes the cloned number 
for one node in RED. The LSCD protocol is found to be 
superior to the other protocols in terms of all measures, 
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including lifetime, storage, detection probability, and 
robustness against adversaries’ attacks. Table III shows that, 
although the SDC and LSCD protocols have high clone 
detection probabilities, SDC’s capacity to resist compromise 
attacks is far less than that of the LSCD protocol for the 
following reasons: In the SDC protocol, the witness is stored in 
one or several nodes. When performing clone detection, the 
nodes compare with the witness by sending detection 
information to this area and broadcasting information. 
Therefore, in the SDC protocol, the adversary, once they 
compromise a node, can obtain the map function of the witness; 
thus, they know the area in which the witness is stored. Then, 
the adversary adopts some methods to prevent detection or 
further damages the nodes in this area to make the SDC 
protocol expire. Thus, its robustness against compromise is 
medium. In the LSCD protocol, the locations of each witness 
are not the same. Even if the adversary compromises a node, it 
still cannot obtain the storage location of the witness, thus 
making it unable to be attacked. Therefore, its robustness 
against compromise is high. 
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We turn to the analysis of the time overhead of the LSCD 
protocol. The time overhead is defined as the hops required to 
perform clone detection or to construct the witness path. The 
time overhead is ߝଶ ൅	ሺ԰ െ 1ሻ/2 ൅ ߝଷ ൅ Ψ/ݎ for constructing 
the witness path in the LSCD protocol, and the time overhead is 
԰ in the other protocols (i.e., LSM, RED, and SDC). The ߝଶ ൅
ߝଷ ൅ Ψ/ݎ and ԰ are the same order of magnitude; thus, the time 
overhead for constructing those clone protocols is equal. The 
maximum time overhead is π԰ݎ ൅ ԰	for clone detection in the 
LSCD protocol, and the time overhead is also ԰ in the other 
protocols (i.e., LSM, RED, and SDC). Because the LSCD 
protocol is well designed to use the energy of the area far from 
the Sink to perform clone detection, the clone detection routing 
path in the LSCD protocol is longer than that in other protocols. 
Thus, the overhead time of the LSCD protocol is higher than 
those of the other protocols.  
TABLE III  
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF SEVERAL CLONE DETECTION PROTOCOLS 
 Lifetime Memory occupancy 
Detecting 
probability 
Robustness 
against 
compromise 
LSM low Oሺg. p. d√݊ሻ ሺ1 െ 0.235ሻ௚௣ௗ strong 
RED medium Oሺg. p. dሻ ሺ1 െ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻௗሻ௤ weak 
SDC medium Oሺϖሻ ൎ 1 medium 
LSCD high ڿΨ/ݎۀ ൎ 1 strong 
 
 
Although the LSCD protocol exhibits a good performance 
compared to other protocols in terms of the energy utilization 
rate, network lifetime, the storage performance, the protocol 
suffers from certain disadvantages. One such disadvantage is 
that, although establishing the witness path in the LSCD 
protocol is simple, the clone detection routing is more complex; 
therefore, the LSCD protocol has higher requirements on the 
network. The other disadvantage is that this protocol is more 
sensitive to the failure of the node in terms of the success rate of 
clone detection, similar to the RED protocol [2]. Because the 
LSCD protocol clone detection routing can only ensure that 
there is a detection route to meet the witness, if the route has 
failed, the success rate of clone detection will be affected. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper is the first to propose a clone detection protocol 
for WSNs whose storage requirement is only a small constant: 
the LSCD protocol. Utilizing energy for storage, the LSCD 
protocol stores witness nodes along a ring in a constant-length 
route and fully utilizes remaining energy in non-hotspots to 
construct sufficient clone detection routes that are bound to 
encounter witness routes. Thus, the protocol successfully 
achieves a small constant storage requirement and a higher 
detection probability. The LSCD protocol has fully distributed 
characteristics and strong robustness against attacks. Based on 
the theoretical analysis and experimental results, the LSCD 
protocol is proven to improve various performance indicators, 
namely, the network lifetime is increased by 20%, the detection 
probability is increased by 50%，and the storage requirements 
are only 1/5 those of the LSM protocol. The achievements of 
this research will contribute to the design of energy-efficient 
and secure WSNs, which represent key components of CPS. 
In the preceding discussion, we have assumed that the node 
IDs cannot be replicated; however, a powerful adversary can 
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also replicate node IDs, which leads to the need for improved 
clone detection. In our future work, we would like to explore 
additional mechanisms to ensure that our protocols continue to 
function even in the face of powerful adversaries who can 
replicate node IDs. Moreover, trust is a powerful mechanism 
for detecting and distinguishing misbehaving nodes. We could 
also use trust techniques in conjunction with traditional clone 
detection protocols to enhance the security of WSNs, thus 
preventing an adversary from damaging the network. 
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